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This COVID-19 crisis has been a shock to us all. While the epidemiological issues 
rage on, and economic uncertainties rising, it has become clear that this crisis is 
much more than a contraction. Even when a vaccine emerges, and economic activity 
resumes, the old normal is history (Grandori 2020). We will be living in a different 
world, where only the resilient and the bold can survive – let alone thrive. It will take 
some concerted effort for to not succumb to their natural proclivity to simply repeat 
what has always worked for them in the past. 
 
There are a number of drivers that shape this crisis as an exceptional one, and which 
turned 2020 into a momentous year. COVID-19 has not just slowed us down; it has 
catalysed the process of digitisation. Since physical proximity between people is at 
the core of the pandemic, we have relied, in both our personal and professional lives, 
on remote connections and untold transactions. This has a number of implications. 
 
First, Big Tech, which mediates our interactions, has come out of the crisis much 
stronger than before (Kenney & Zysman, 2020; Jacobides, 2020). However, that has 
also attracted the glare of the spotlight, and concerns arising over unfair advantage 
and global dominance have changed the regulatory discourse. In the joint hearing 
for Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple in the US Congress on July 29, the four 
firms’ CEOs were grilled by US Representatives. Their concerns included unfair 
practices that go well beyond the traditional toolkit of antitrust law, and which oblige 
economists to study business models – for a change (Caffara et al, 2020). In the EU, 
the Data Act and the Data Services Act that are currently being debated, as well as 
the new “tool” for platform competition, denote a regulatory sea change. In the new 
world, regulators will directly shape the competitive arena in an unprecedented 
manner, dictating what is ruled in or out, and which business models are fair or 
unfair. 
 
Second, consumption patterns are changing, with platforms and ecosystems 
becoming ever-more important – whether they hail from Big Tech or not. The growth 
of modularisation, digital connectivity (including 5G) and the “Internet of Things” 
provides the potential for significant further disruption in fields that had traditionally 
been relatively isolated, from healthcare to education. To keep on selling in this new 
marketplace, firms need to rethink their distribution networks and reach their 
customers through business ecosystems (Jacobides, 2019). 
 
Third, production is also changing – fast. Global supply chains have been upended, 
as national governments react to assert their economic interests and undo the 
globalised structures that had emerged – especially in technology. Recent BCG trade 
simulations show that global trade is likely to drop by 20 to 30% from 2019 levels 
due to a combination of global recession, geopolitical frictions and new supply chain 
structures. The absolute trade volume of 18 trillion dollars is likely to be recovered by 
2023, but with a completely new set of trade routes, i.e. the US-China trade will 
have lost 128 billion dollars, while ASEAN and India will boom (Aylor et al, 2020). 
The technological war brewing between the US and China is leading to a multi-polar 
world, where designing redundant loosely coupled supply chains emerge as the new 
normal, and where geopolitics will inevitably clash with economic efficiency or 
strategic desirability. New manufacturing technologies, including advanced robotics, 
additive manufacturing (e.g. 3D printing), and augmented reality, threaten to 
undermine supply chains built on traditional labour cost arbitrage, while at the same 
time birthing new giants upstream who will provide vital infrastructure. Beyond that, 
firms are using technology to rethink how they are structured, and how they work – 
from the digitization of processes to the service-isation of products (including 
migration to the Cloud, which has bred a new, powerful set of Hyperscalers – often 
owned by Big Tech). 
 
Fourth, labour practices are changing. While white collar-work from home was 
relatively minor pre-COVID many companies were remarkably resilient and swift o 
get more than 90% of their workforce operating virtually.  A recent BCG study 
showed that companies that are not dependent on plants/work sites expect around 
40% of workers to use remote working in the future and that hybrid models will 
exemplify the new normal of work (Bailey et al, 2020). The recognition that working 
from home is here to stay will have important consequences, both for the way firms 
are managed and for how employees or contractors connect to the firm. This will 
prompt a rethink of managerial and leadership practices (Valikangas 2020) and 
organisational boundaries. At a societal level, the growth of the “gig economy” may 
lead us to reflect on the merits and shortcomings of big platforms, from 
monster.com and TaskRabbit to Uber and Deliveroo, and how they relate to their 
workers.  
 
Fifth, digitisation has created an explosion of data, while connectivity has allowed us 
to manipulate, move and monitor it in unprecedented ways. Thus, data is becoming 
a hotly contested asset. It is the engine for personalisation and the basis for 
individualised value creation, which translates into stickiness, which itself translates 
into margins (Koster & von Szczepanski, 2020). Data is also the training ground for 
computational statistics – or, more sexily, Artificial Intelligence (AI), which consists of 
algorithms that can either diagnose or predict. AI advances with data, and this 
further increases the advantages of having loads of data on tap. So, in this new 
economy, in addition to the (sometimes over-hyped) “network effects” offered by 
platforms and ecosystems, there are also “learning effects” – originating in data and 
begat by scale and scope – that drive competitive position.  
 
In this context, firms must hone resilient and adaptive capabilities fast. But, what do 
these capabilities come down to? In related research, we consider that there are 
three areas where firms must focus and sharpen their skills in (Jacobides & Reeves, 
2020). First, they need to work to improve their understanding of the competitive 
terrain, as this mapping is more important than ever given the current flux.  They 
need to look at the changes in demand and discern between temporary shifts; new 
trends; boosts; and catalysts, directing their resources accordingly. Second, beyond 
their improved understanding of the nature and level of demand, they need to 
rethink their business models. Given environmental shifts, firms must be able to ask 
existential questions, including how they can monetise their advantage, as they can 
no longer take their industry architectures as a given. In particular, they may want to 
consider how to build or connect to dominant digital platform and ecosystem, since 
distribution and production is now so heavily mediated by them. Third, beyond being 
able to respond to such massive business-level changes, firms (which typically 
operate in multiple businesses) must hone the skills of capital reallocation (Hall, 
Lovallo & Musters, 2012) and corporate renewal (Agarwal & Helfat, 2009; Folta, 
Helfat & Karim, 2016). In particular, they need to look carefully at their business 
portfolios, and have the courage to reallocate capital and resources from divisions 
that generate cash with poor long-term prospects to areas that will benefit from 
future growth, as opposed to stick with historical patterns of capital allocation and 
temporarily batten down the hatches.  
 
The challenge is that firms find it hard to be so bold. BCG’s recent survey of more 
than 300 large companies around the world showed that, while most companies 
initially focused on immediate reactions to the outbreak and preparing for the 
eventual recession, they also understood that they would need to reimagine their 
businesses for a fundamentally different post-crisis world. However, many businesses 
delayed their responses on this dimension – and there are some perennial 
organisational challenges that make reimagination difficult.  
 
Organizations are also loath to reallocate capital, making them quite slow to respond. 
In good times, inertia and internal politics push organisations to deploy capital in 
irrational ways: they tend to distribute it equally between divisions or subsidiaries, 
leading to the “1/n” bias (Bardolet et al 2011). They also tend to follow historical 
precedent in determining capital allocation. In times of crisis, they try to suppress all 
costs across the board, including R&D, in an attempt to “batten down the hatches”. 
Yet this handicaps their ability to take advantage of new growth pillars, leading to 
significant underperformance when the crisis abates (Flammer & Ioannou, 2020). In 
other words, many companies fail to de-average capital allocation sufficiently, both 
across businesses and over time.  
 
Contrast that with the speedy reaction we’re seeing from platforms and ecosystems. 
In particular, look at some of these tech-dominated ecosystems in China, a country 
whose growth has been propelled by a ruthlessly competitive system. The response, 
weeks after January 20, 2020, when it was announced that a novel coronavirus had 
spread from animals to humans, was remarkable:  
 
• After three weeks, Alibaba’s Alipay lifestyle platform had launched 12+ new 
features and services provided by its partners, including a live map aggregating 
public locations where infected patients had first been identified, free online 
medical consultations, insurance cover for frontline medical workers and 
subsidies for small enterprises who were struggling.  
 
• Within a month, Meituan-Dianping, the food delivery platform, was ready for a 
sharp uptick in sales – by addressing customers’ concerns about contact with 
delivery staff – with its new “contactless” system that used intelligent lockers and 
other facilities to carry out deliveries in major cities. 
 
• Also within the first month, digital ecosystems enabled China to roll out a 
contact-tracing system. By mid-April, it had used smartphone apps to track the 
health status and movements of nearly 450 million people, and pinpoint 160,000 
cases of close contact with infected individuals.  
 
Such agility demonstrates both how and why ecosystems have grown so rapidly in 
China, setting new expectations in terms of resilience and speed of reaction. But 
what are the drivers behind them? One reason that these firms have developed 
responsively, without the historical and administrative “baggage” that we see in 
many developed economies. Setting aside issues of “infant industry protection”, the 
rapid response of Chinese ecosystems was made possible by operating models that 
facilitate rapid innovation and delivery across a broad network of private and public 
partners, with seamless information transfer. As a result, leading digital players in 
China – along with business partners within their networks – were able to release 
customised COVID-19 offerings and interfaces in record time. And if they could not 
deliver on their own, they opened up their ecosystems to new partners and brought 
them on board in double-quick time (see Chan, Lang, Modi, Tang & von Szczepanski, 
2020). 
  
Chinese digital ecosystems rolled out everything from AI-enabled chatbots and 
telemedicine services to diagnostic tools. They raced to help countless bricks-and-
mortar companies get online, resolved supply-chain bottlenecks and redeployed 
hundreds of thousands of workers. All these moves helped mitigate the economic 
damage wreaked by COVID-19.  
 
China may be a unique case, in terms of infrastructure and (limited) regulatory 
constraints, but such responses to the pandemic highlight a resilience to innovative 
solutions that transcend geographic and geopolitical boundaries. When we studied 
10 innovative ecosystem-sponsoring Chinese companies and their practices, we saw 
that their resilience was based on rapidly introducing COVID-19 offerings, creating 
new platforms, broadening existing digital ecosystems, accelerating the rollout of 
nascent technologies, helping businesses make the transition to online and 
leveraging the power of public-private partnerships. And while the giant tech 
companies that orchestrate China’s largest digital ecosystems have rich financial, 
technological and human resources to throw at new challenges, increased resilience 
to external shocks goes deeper than that. A more valuable lesson is the importance 
of quickly grasping the many implications of disruptive change, devising strategies to 
respond and mobilising the organisation (Chan et al, 2020). 
 
Whether we like it or not, we are living through a period of momentous change. 
Supply-chain arrangements are reimagined and reinvented. New platforms and 
ecosystems are supplanting traditional delivery channels. Work is becoming digitised 
and modularised – and, as such, more reconfigurable. New production technologies 
are creating new operational and business models, often disrupting or reconfiguring 
sectors. New work arrangements are taking hold, making us rethink the boundaries 
of the firm.  
 
In this context, some traditional hierarchical firms are losing their appeal, while other 
giants, propelled by technologies that involve high fixed and low variable costs, 
learning economies and network externalities are becoming ever-more dominant. 
While geopolitics and renewed regulatory fervour will have significant impact, it is 
clear that the foundations of corporate success are changing. It is thus more 
important than ever to define purposes, focus on rapid response and resilience, and 
to move with the times, reconfiguring the organisation to make it more responsive 
and entrepreneurial.  
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